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Mortimer, McKeown and Singh's analysis of the ethics of early life intervention is a 
timely reminder that philosophy has practical applications. Their assessment of the 
ethics of early life interventions in UK and US policy offers a compelling example of 
why bioethics is critical to formulating policy consistent with intended aims, for 
example for fairness, equity and social justice.  
 
Mortimer and colleagues focus on current policy in the United Kingdom and how it 
apportions responsibility for future population outcomes. The ways in which policy 
frames responsibility, they argue, provides a view into its 'applicability and 
actionability in the real world'. Their demonstration of the general policy ambivalence 
about the apportioning of responsibility is an important illustration of how political 
decisions are most often the result of multiple compromises, rather than the outcome 
of a neat translation of values into policy. This ambivalence notwithstanding, their 
analysis shows a strong focus on parental responsibility for a child's life chances, 
based on her early life environment. While the authors make mention of the 
increasing prominence of neurodevelopmental and epigenetic frameworks for 
explaining such associations in early life intervention policy, they engage less with 
how these new frameworks are fundamentally reshaping the responsibility debate.  
 
The rise of the early intervention approach should be seen in the wider context of 
recent changes in our understanding of human biology. The question of parental 
responsibility for a child's outcomes for the latter half of the twentieth century was 
cast in terms of a nature/nurture binary, where 'nature', or genetics, was fixed, and 
biological heredity was understood only in genetic terms that is (mostly) ruling out 
direct environmental effects or non-genetic but biological factors (Meloni 2016). 
Importantly for any historical description of EI policy in the US and UK, eugenics 
ideas were influential in pre-World War II EI policy in the US but to a lesser degree 
in the UK. The formalization of epigenetics as a scientific field - the study of how 
gene expression is modifiable without alterations to the DNA - has recast the early life 
environment as a critical window of opportunity to mold the impressionable body 
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(Lock 2012). It signals a growing interest in brain and genomic plasticity that has 
taken place over the last fifteen years or so, in the so-called postgenomic era. A 
thoroughly developmental view of biology often underpins the logic of early 
intervention (Wastell and White 2017). In this view, embodied for instance in the 
field of Developmental Origins of Health and Disease (DOHaD), environmental 
factors operating in certain critical windows of biological sensitivity are deemed to 
shape in a (semi)permanent way long term health trajectories – sometimes even across 
generations. It is because biology is particularly plastic in certain critical windows – 
and not timeless as in the classical genetic view - that intervention is important. It is 
because time and place have come (again) to matter so deeply for human biology – 
for the brain and the genome - that intervention needs to be timely and specific 
(Mansfield 2012). The 'early life environment' in this formulation is frequently 
reduced to the maternal body, as an easily identifiable focus for policy intervention. 
While UK EI policy uses the 'gender neutral terminology of "parenting"' (Gillies et al. 
2016), there is a gendered dimension as to how responsibility is apportioned which 
also requires bioethics engagement. 
 
The growing appreciation of epigenetic factors in addition to existing genetic ones has 
important implications for conceptions of early childhood and is thus a crucial 
component of the responsibility debate for EI policy. Bioethicists have devoted 
considerable time to the implications of genetics for understandings of responsibility 
(see for example Levitt and Manson 2007, Hammond 2010). The philosophical 
question of 'epigenetic responsibility' (Hedlund 2011) merits closer attention.  
 
This debate is important given that a developmental view of biology where the human 
body can be profoundly shaped in certain critical periods by social events implies a 
logic of social intervention very different from the old eugenic argument that it is the 
distribution of bad genes in certain social or racial groups to represent a problem for 
the overall wellness of a population. However, it does not rule out a eugenic view nor 
is by itself a guarantee of more inclusive social policy compared to hard hereditarian 
genetics. There are obvious historical references here: the 1910-1911 debate on the 
poisoning effects of alcoholism at the British Eugenics Society had  “temperance 
doctors” claiming – for humanitarian reasons and against mainstream eugenicists - 
that parental alcoholism affected child health and advocating for restrictive measures 
on drunkards and sometimes their children, given their “poisoned” heredity (Meloni 
2016). More recently neurobiologist Adam Perkins has made the controversial 
argument that welfare dependency is a transmissible trait. In his book The	Welfare	
Trait:	How	State	Benefits	Affect	Personality,	he	claims that welfare erodes human capital 
by encouraging the proliferation of an “employment-resistant personality profile”. 
According to Perkins, such people not only “suffer impaired life outcomes, but also 
transmit that difficulty to their children and thus risk damaging the life chances of the 
next generation” (2016, 4). Significantly, Perkins’ thesis about dysfunctional welfare 
does not follow a logic of faulty genes but one of developmental effects: it “hinges 
less on genetic factors and more on the crucial role of childhood disadvantage in 
forming the employment-resistant personality” (116, our italics). It describes welfare 
dependency as a social stressor that damages the developmental trajectory of the 
present and future generation. Through parental neglect or other disadvantages in 
early life the antisocial features of the ‘welfare trait’ are transmitted across 
generations impairing the personality of future citizens. 
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This example may seem extreme but it is significant in that it highlights the negative 
possibilities of new scientific knowledge that casts early life as plastic and malleable 
to social stressors or deprivation. As Mortimer and colleagues state, EI policy 
increasingly invokes neurodevelopmental science and epigenetics to advocate for 
early life intervention as a social good. However, such frameworks may also - 
inadvertently or explicitly - support the discrimination of certain groups exposed to 
unfavorable environments. As social scientists and as bioethicists, we need to be 
aware that the ‘bios’ of bioethics is rapidly changing, and that to be investigated 
appropriately philosophical enquiry should be associated with a stronger historical 
awareness through which we can appreciate the polysemy of the many moral 
economies potentially related to scientific findings. In the present world order, where 
right-wing, racist, anti-immigrant and populist voices are increasingly shaping policy 
in the US, UK and Europe, it is no longer possible to assume that science or policy 
will by default try to serve all members of a population equally and fairly. The 
narrative of the persistence and ineluctability of liberal-democratic institutions post 
World War II may be more fragile and precarious than we had hoped.  
 
As a counter, we support Maria Hedlund's call for 'epigenetic responsibility'. 	Her 
formulation (2011), based on Young's social connection model (2006), advocates for 
a framework that is cognizant of the historical circumstances that have structured 
inequalities, but takes a forward-looking approach that calls for collective 
responsibility for improving those circumstances. This model is well suited to address 
outcomes that seemingly cannot be traced to single actors. For Hedlund, epigenetic 
responsibility is political, and accountability traceable to responsible governance. As 
such, it is a model that could successfully address the policy ambivalence about 
responsibility that Mortimer and colleagues describe for current EI policy, given the 
model's advocacy for collective accountability. Furthermore, this approach might 
respond to the frequent inconsistency Mortimer and colleagues identify for UK EI 
policy: that EI is often framed as an opportunity for addressing societal inequalities, 
and yet this would only be the case if attending to injustice is a collective 
responsibility. Importantly, it is a powerful counter to frameworks that pathologize 
individuals or allocate responsibility too squarely on one set of actors. Such a model 
will become increasingly important as neurobiological and epigenetic frameworks of 
health and wellbeing shape policy, which is never 'just policy', but carries far reaching 
implications for whether all are treated fairly and equally.  
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